

perfsONAR

Node Maintenance: Security & Operational Concerns

ASTRON perfSONAR training

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Outline

- Introduction & Overview
- Security
 - Software Updates & Accounting
 - User Accounts & Machine Access
 - Physical Security
 - Service Audit
 - Firewalls & IDSs
 - Logging
- Conclusions

Introduction

- The perfSONAR Toolkit should be treated the same as any other host in your infrastructure
 - E.g. it should receive the same care and attention from the server team as something like the mail or DNS server
 - Those that forgot they had one are at risk for compromise, and may be upset about such an experience
 - There are many tools out there that can ease the burden, there is no replacement for a human regularly checking



Introduction

- Recommendations for deployment often mean allowing this resource to live in the cold dark internet, to allow for a clean view of pure network performance
 - This doesn't mean we don't want to forget about security or maintenance – in fact we need to be careful to implement adequate, intelligent, and performance focused countermeasures where we can
- The following sections outline some of the items that should be examined on a semi-regular basis.
 - N.B. All of these are 'typical' recommendations that are SOP for Linux servers, apply this knowledge elsewhere if need be.
 - Some are specific to perfSONAR

perfSONAR Risk

- Since perfSONAR hosts are usually fast, well connected hosts, the main risk is that someone will get on and use the host for a DDOS attack
 - If this happens, WE ALL SUFFER!
 - perfSONAR nodes will get taken down, making the perfSONAR ecosystem less useful
- Data on the host is not particularly valuable.

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Security



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- Firewalls* have a role in the enterprise network
 - They protect against the unknown – they are designed to protect the network from bad things getting in, and private things from getting out.
 - *IF* you have scientific resources behind a firewall (e.g. you aren't using the Science DMZ paradigm yet) should you also place a perfSONAR host behind a firewall
 - This will give the perfSONAR host the same 'view' of what is going on
 - If performance is bad, you may want to consider a comparison with a perfSONAR host directly outside of the firewall, and testing to the same things.

*<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-41-Rev1/sp800-41-rev1.pdf>

Access Control Lists (ACLs)

- You can use router or host ACLs to control who can run tests to/from your perfSONAR host
 - This can be used to reduce the DDOS risk
 - BUT: restricting access makes your host less useful! (for you, and others)
 - Detecting the DDOS using via traffic monitoring or an Intrusion Detection System is a much better solution
- The perfSONAR Toolkit features IPTables rules for all essential services – this can be considered a host-based firewall
 - More information here: <http://www.perfsonar.net/deploy/security-considerations/>
 - The administrator has the ability to add/delete rules, see the documentation link above for more details

Intrusion Detection

- There are numerous solutions in the IDS space (host based, appliance based, external server based).
 - All have positives and negatives
 - Typically the use of external systems should start as a conversation between you and your security people.
 - Host based IDSs are software packages that can be installed on the perfSONAR node – we will talk about some here.
- The perfSONAR toolkit comes with Fail2ban
(http://www.fail2ban.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page)
 - This software is designed to parse logs (apache, ssh access, etc.) and look for behavior consistent with attack vectors.
 - For example, a brute force SSH attempt from a host will result in several log messages in the secure log – fail2ban can detect this
 - When it finds behavior (normally with a couple of minute delay) it will send an email alert, and can be configured to block the host using IPTables or TCPWrappers

- Other Options:
 - Denyhosts - <http://denyhosts.sourceforge.net>
 - Similar to fail2ban, relies on scripts to parse logs and insert rules when bad behavior is detected
 - OSSEC - <http://www.ossec.net>
 - Client/Server based system that can be used to watch multiple hosts.
 - Detects bad behavior from log files, can also be used to watch for anomalies such as disk failure, user behavior, interface promiscuousness, and installation of software.
 - Snort - <https://www.snort.org>
 - System capable of real time analysis and prevention of attack vectors through the use of heuristics
- There are many more pay and free options in this space, look around and choose what makes you comfortable.

Rootkit Detection

- There are two solutions that are typically used to search a host for infections (e.g. 'rootkits')
 - These are 'last resort' tools normally
 - Remember that a skilled cracker (e.g. not a script kiddie) will cover their tracks – making a rootkit detector required to determine damage
- If you have a fear that you were compromised, or just want to run one of these scanners in the background and have it mail you periodic reports, they can provide useful information:
 - <http://rkhunter.sourceforge.net>
 - <http://www.chkrootkit.org>



Logging

- Central logging helps you pull all the data from the perfSONAR node to some other location for analysis
 - Helps track faults
 - Helps watch for mischief
- There are also numerous solutions in the central logging space.
 - Many are free, some are not
 - Some have GUIs and can aggregate lots of hosts
 - Shop around and test things out – some have features you may never need. Sometimes just setting up ‘syslog-ng’ and forwarding to a central host is sufficient
- Some options:
 - <http://logstash.net>
 - <http://www.elasticsearch.org/overview/kibana/>

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Host Security




Securing your perfSONAR host

- The following slides are some well known techniques for making a Linux host more secure
- Some of these are already configured if you do a 'toolkit' install, and some are under consideration for the next release
- These slides are just a quick overview of things to consider

Software Updates

- The perfSONAR toolkit is built on CentOS Linux version 7
 - CentOS uses the '**yum**' package management system for software version control
 - Typically you can just run '**yum update**' (with root permissions) to bring the system up to date. Do this frequently.

Reasons I upgrade my software




Software Updates

- For some years now, we have an auto-update feature now available:
 - http://docs.perfsonar.net/manage_update.html#automatic-updates
 - Auto-updates will pull down packages from upstream, nightly, to ensure the system stays up to date.
- Obligatory Pro/Con Discussion:
 - Auto-updates are one factor in host security, they are not a panacea. They are also not an excuse to ignore the server exists.
 - Some updates (e.g. kernels) would need a reboot
 - Pulling down updates immediately can sometimes lead to situations where things break (e.g. CentOS or perfSONAR broke something upstream).
 - But developers usually react quickly.

Updates

- Automatic updates via ‘Enabled Services’:
Note – this is not the end all solution, but it will grab critical things as they come in.




Software Auditing

- The perfSONAR Toolkit installs only packages that are required for perfSONAR
 - a minimal Linux install plus network monitoring tools
- Some sites may decide they don't need all of these features – if this is the case it may be worthwhile to conduct a software audit
 - **yum list installed**
 - **yum remove packageName**
- Note that **yum** can process dependencies too – if you notice that removing something you don't think is necessary will delete things that are necessary, rethink that choice 😊
- For example, you don't intend to use XWindows on the server, remove it:
 - **yum groupremove "X Window System"**

User Accounts

- perfSONAR can be used in three main ways:
 - Users can view results via the web-based interface. Typically an administrator will have to configure the tests on the machine
 - External users can invoke tests against a perfSONAR machine to the measurement daemons
 - Those with shell accounts can log in, and perform tests/administer the machine (depending on permissions)
- Of these, granting shell access to the machine is the riskiest to deal with
- Some questions to consider when granting a shell account to someone:
 - What are they going to use it for?
 - Will they be an admin, or just a user?
 - Are they a trusted user at the institution?
 - Is the host linked to any other critical institutional resources?



Use of sudo

- The perfSONAR Toolkit also features the `sudo` tool that allows someone with 'administrator' privileges (set up when accounts are created) to invoke root level access
- By default we allow people in the 'wheel' group the ability to run sudo
- Some changes can be made to secure this greater in the `/etc/sudoers` file:
 - Require password with each command
 - Change **ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL** to be **ALL=(ALL): ALL**
 - Limit the commands that can be run via sudo (see file for details)

Centralized Authentication

- If your site already uses this on servers, it can be extended to the perfSONAR Toolkit as well (it's just Linux after all ...)
 - Typical auth systems are LDAP or Kerberos
- Follow the instructions for setting up this type of system, and finding the correct packages. These documents will be better than what perfSONAR can produce.
- Note – this is non-standard, but can be done if your site has policies that govern the use of this type of system.

Tightening Machine Access

- SSH should be the only login protocol that is running.
- There are some basic SSH protections worth considering:
 - Disable root login in `/etc/ssh/sshd_config` (restart the service after doing this)
 - **PermitRootLogin no**
 - Allow specific users in `/etc/ssh/sshd_config` (restart the service after doing this)
 - **AllowUsers alice bob**
 - Disable old protocols `/etc/ssh/sshd_config` (restart the service after doing this)
 - **Protocol 2**
 - It is also possible to run SSH on a non-standard port:
 - **Port 2345**
 - Note that if you take this step, ensure that selinux knows about the change (see **semanage**) and that the proper port is open in IPTables (if you are using it).

- SSH Throttling can be installed into IPTables to prevent brute force attacks:
 - **# Throttling of SSH**
 - **-A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 --syn -m limit --limit 1/m --limit-burst 3 -j ACCEPT**
 - **-A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 --syn -j DROP**
- If there are concerns about the use of passwords, you can require public key authentication.
 - This will require all users to generate a public/private key pair and authenticate to the machine in this manner.
 - The following change can be made to **/etc/ssh/sshd_config** (restart the service after doing this)
 - **# Disable password authentication forcing use of keys**
 - **PasswordAuthentication no**
- Lastly, you can limit the exposure of SSH (via IPTables) to ranges of hosts
 - Allow only specific subnets to access or a 'bastion' host

Physical Security

- Lets say your server is in a bad neighborhood, it makes sense to protect the physical access.
 - Configure the BIOS to prevent booting from external devices (e.g. USB, CD, etc.)
 - Set the BIOS bootloader password
- If the server is set up for serial access, don't leave root logged into the console (no-brainer ...)



Auditing Services

- The default settings for the perfSONAR Toolkit will only enable essential services.
- If you are interested in disabling services you have no intention of using, try the following:
 - **chkconfig --list | grep '3:on'**
 - To disable service, enter:
 - **service serviceName stop**
 - **chkconfig serviceName off**
- Similarly, you can view the services that are in a listening state on the host like this:
 - **netstat -tulpn**
 - Also can use netmap, from an external host:
 - **nmap -sT -O localhost**
 - **nmap -sT -O server.example.com**

Security Scanning

- The use of a vulnerability scanner on a regular basis is an important tool.
 - By doing this, you can see if there are any exposed risks via the software on your machine
 - perfSONAR runs a scan with each major release for default settings – the use of other tools or modifications may change the risk vectors for a machine.
- There are lots of scanners, two popular ones:
 - <http://www.tenable.com/products/nessus>
 - <http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/appscan>
- In the general case, any similar implementation will do the same thing – generate a report of categorized warnings for a given vulnerability set.

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Conclusions

- A perfSONAR server should requires the same amount of “care and feeding” as any server
 - Yum auto-updates help a lot, but need to make sure they are set them up correctly
 - General server best practices are sufficient
 - Use external monitoring when you can to watch for bad behaviors
- Security is only as advanced as you are willing to make it.
 - Use of external tools, or the audits that you perform, can be a strong defense.
 - If no effort is put in, be prepared to treat the machine as disposable (e.g. do you want ‘pets’ or do you want ‘cattle’)
 - In the disposable case – you certainly don’t want to integrate the machine into your environment very tightly
- There is no magic pill in this space
 - If someone wants to get in, odds are they have a lot more resources than you do to make it so
 - perfSONAR nodes are public and have been compromised before
- Spend some time talking to the right people at your campus about expectations and realities, and then make a plan.

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Event

Presenter, Organization, Email
Date

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